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Abstract
This paper considers the effects of aging in a currency union with
endogenous growth. It is shown that mortality, labour supply and
social security funding have no effect on inflation and pose therefore
no problems for monetary integration. On the other hand, the demand
for medical care speeds up inflation. Hence, if a currency union accepts
a new member in which families have a relatively high need for medical
care, its inflation rate will increase, but the growth rate and welfare
will decrease everywhere in the enlarged union. There exists a growth-
maximizing level for social security funding. The extension of funding
beyond this level retards growth and welfare.
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1 Introduction
Since 2002, over 300 million Europeans in 12 countries have used Euro as
a currency of exchange. The demographic variation among these countries
is however large. Total Fertility Rate (TFR) is relatively high for some
members of the EMU (e.g. 1.9 for Ireland, 1.7 for France and Finland) and
relatively low for others (e.g. 1.3 for Germany and Greece and 1.2 for Italy
and Spain).1 Does this prose a problem for the stability of the EMU? For
some new members of the EU, TFR is even lower (e.g. 1.2 for Estonia,
Slovenia and Czech Republic, 1.1 for Latvia).2 Should the EMU restrict the
membership of these? This paper attempts to answer these questions.
Rising longevity affects national savings and intensifies the competition
of resources between consumption, investment and the health needs of the
elderly. Recent empirical work indicates that it may even slow down economic
growth.3 Zhang et.al. (2003) explain this through the assumption that aging
changes the preferences of the median voter with regard to taxation for public
education.4 In this study, we offer an alternative explanation as follows.
Because a currency union compels economies into a sub-optimal tax system
by imposing a uniform inflation rate, its establishment may together with
the consequences of aging retard growth.
1United Nations (2000).
2United Nations (2000).
3Using the cross-section data set in Barro and Wolf (1989), Zhang et.al. (2003) reports
that as the initial life expectancy rises from below 60 to 69, the investment ratio and the
growth rate increase substantially; but when the initial life expectancy rises to 70 and
over, the investment ratio and the growth rate drop, although their levels are still higher
than in countries with low life expectancy.
4The median voter is willing to increase the tax rate for public education at low
longevity, but beyond some level of longevity, further declines in mortality may lead the
median voter to lower the tax rate. Hence, the human capital accumulation may rise
initially but may eventually fall.
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Aging may have several and even opposing effects on growth. Steady
mortality declines have raised the fraction of population living in retirement
substantially in industrial countries. Consequently, the proportion of work-
ing population has been falling and is expected to fall much further in the
next few decades. The return on individual investment in human capital de-
pends positively on remaining active years. Postponing retirement age raises
the proportion of working individuals and the returns on human capital,
thus increasing the sustainable growth rate. Because increments in life ex-
pectancy do not affect optimal investment in human capital, but increase the
proportion of retirees, they speed up growth only if they are accompanied by
simultaneous increments in the working period.5 Most developed countries
have old-age social security programs, which will come under increasing pres-
sure from mortality decline. Because many recent proposals call for replacing
unfunded with fully funded social security, it is interesting to compare the
effects of mortality decline across different social security systems.
In this study, we examine endogenous growth in a monetary economy
by a model of a dynastic family which accumulates (human) capital through
saving and holds money for transactions purposes. Each family contains both
young (working) and elderly (retired) people. Given the discussion above,
we characterize aging by the following parameters:
(i) Mortality declines. This is equivalent to the decrease in the rate of time
preference [Cf. Blanchard and Fischer (1989), pp. 115-143].
(ii) The proportion of working population declines. This is equivalent to the
decrease of the productivity of (human) capital.
5Cf. Echevarria (2003).
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(iii) The demand for medical care increases.
Furthermore, we consider a fully funded social security system as one which
families finance wholly by themselves, an unfunded system as one which the
government finances wholly, and a partially funded system as one which the
government and families finance together.
In this study, a key feature of the analysis is the central role assigned
to the congestion of medical services. Following Palokangas (2003), we show
that a specific form of congestion is necessary for persistent growth. Inflation
has then two effects on the growth rate. First, its increase provides the
government with more seigniorage and thereby helps to supply more medical
care. This promotes private output, private saving, capital accumulation
and economic growth. On the other hand, a higher inflation rate leads to
higher transaction costs in the private sector, lower income, lower capital
accumulation and slower growth. Where these two opposed effects exactly
match, the inflation rate is optimal and the growth rate maximal. There
exists a number of endogenously-growing economies, which produce the same
composite good. On the assumption that there is no trade in factors of
production, also the growth rates of economies may differ. A currency union
compels the same inflation rate for all of its members.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 intro-
duces the institutional specifications on which the study is based. Section
3 presents the optimal behaviour of a private family, on which in section 4
the equilibrium of the private sector is based. Section 5 characterizes the
structure of the public sector and section 6 constructs optimal policy rules
for a rational government of a single economy. Finally, section 7 examines
the effect of currency unions in this environment.
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2 The setting
(i) Production and consumption. We aggregate all goods in the economy into
a single good, the price of which is p. There are two assets, money and capital.
There is a fixed number J of similar private families who save, invest in
capital, hold money for transaction purposes and produce goods from capital.
All private families benefit from medical care G. One unit of medical care
is produced from one unit of the good. A fixed share β ∈ [0, 1] of medical
care G is financed privately and the rest publicly through the government’s
budget. This characterized an unfunded social security system for β = 0, a
fully funded system for β = 1 and a partially funded system for β ∈ (0, 1).
Output Y is produced from capital stock K according to
Y = ξK, (1)
where ξ is a parameter. The older people a family contains, the smaller pro-
portion of these takes part in production and the lower ξ. The intertemporal
utility function is given by∫ ∞
0
U(C,G)e−ρtdt =
∫ ∞
0
U(c, g)K1−σe−ρtdt with
U(c, g) = (c+ αg)1−σ/(1− σ), g .= G/K and c .= C/K, (2)
where t is time, C consumption, G medical care, ρ > 0 the constant rate of
time preference, σ ∈ (0, 1) ∪(1,∞) the inverse of the constant intertemporal
elasticity of substitution, and α the constant marginal rate of substitution
between consumption and medical care when the level of instantaneous utility
U is kept constant. The higher mortality, the higher ρ. The older people
a family contains, the more medical care raises its welfare and the higher
subjective price α it is ready to pay for medical care in terms of consumption.
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(ii) Congestion. Congestion results from the existence of many families. As
distinct from aggregate output Y and aggregate capitalK, we denote a single
family’s output and capital by y and k. With congestion, a single family
assumes it will get the more services G˜ from medical care G the larger its
share k/K of aggregate capital stock K. In line with Fischer and Turnovsky
(1998), we specify this as follows:
G˜
.
= (k/K)δG = (k/K)δgK = (k/K)δ−1gk with 0 < δ ≤ 1, (3)
where δ is a parameter. When congestion is proportional, δ = 1, the family
assumes that it receives medical services G˜ in direct proportion to its capital
stock k. When congestion is partial, 0 < δ < 1, the family assumes that it
receives less G˜ than in proportion to k. We ignore the case of no congestion,
δ = 0, where medical care G is a non-rival and non-excludable public good
available equally to each family independent of the size of the economy.
The family takes medical care G, aggregate capital stock K and g
.
= G/K
as given. It perceives the true production function (1) and the true utility
function (2), but so that macroeconomic variables G, K and Y are replaced
by microeconomic variables G˜, k and y = ξk. Because the families are similar,
the consumption-capital ratio c must be the same for the whole economy and
a single family. Given (3), we then obtain a single family’s perceived utility
function as follows:∫ ∞
0
U(ck, G˜)e−ρtdt =
∫ ∞
0
[
c+ α
( k
K
)δ−1
g
]1−σ
k1−σe−ρtdt. (4)
(iii) Tax evasion. We assume that an family is able to hide its income at some
cost in terms of the numeraire good.6 Let py is the family’s total income, qpy
6This assumption is needed to produce a distortion in the public sector, which gives
the government the incentive to use seigniorage.
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hidden income and (1− q)py observed income, where 0 ≤ q ≤ 1. We assume
that the level of income does not affect the family’s ability to conceal income,
but that such activity is subject to increasing costs. The real administrative
cost of hiding income, Z, is then linear homogeneous with respect to total
real income y but increasing and strictly convex with respect to the ratio
q of hidden to total income. With all profits revealed, q = 1, there is no
administrative cost Z = 0. Given these assumptions, the following (real)
cost function can be established:
Z = z(q)y, z′ > 0, z′′ > 0, z(0) = 0, z .= Z/(py), (5)
where z is the ratio of administrative cost to total income.
(iv) Transaction technology. We introduce money as an intermediary good
which reduces transaction costs.7 One unit of transaction services is produced
from one unit of the composite good. The requirement for real transaction
services, V , is an increasing function of real expenditure
E
.
= ck + k˙ + βG˜, (6)
which consists of consumption ck, investment k˙ = dk/dt and the private cost
for medical services G˜, βG˜, and a non-increasing function of the real level
of money balances, M/p, which is the ratio of the money supply M and the
price level p, V = V(E,M/p). This function is also linearly homogeneous,
i.e. a proportional increase in both real expenditure E and real money stock
M/p increases V by the same proportion.
To obtain a stable demand function for money, we assume furthermore
that V is strictly concave and thrice differentiable.8 The function V can then
7This follows Palokangas (2003). Feenstra (1986) shows that under certain conditions,
the approach of placing money in the utility function is equivalent to this approach.
8Thrice differentiability is needed for the differentiability of the elasticity ε in (15).
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be transformed into the form V = v(m)E, where m
.
= M/E is the money-
expenditure ratio and v(m)
.
= V(1,m) is a thrice differentiable function with
v′′ > 0. Finally, we assume that there is a bliss point m¯ for the money-
expenditure ratio with m ≤ m¯ and v(m¯) = v′(m¯) = 0. Defining the rate of
investment φ
.
= k˙/k ≥ 0, we can summarize the transaction technology as:
0 ≤ m .= M/E ≤ m¯, 0 ≤ v(m) = V/E < 1,
v′ ≤ 0, v′′ > 0, v(m¯) = v′(m¯) = 0. (7)
3 The families
In the family’s steady state, the ratios c = C/K, g = G/K as well as the
ratio of medical services (3) to private consumption C = ck, i.e. (k/K)δ−1g/c,
must be constant. This means that the term kδ−1 must be constant as well.
Capital stock k and output y are then constant for 0 < δ < 1. If δ = 1, k
is undetermined, the rate of investment φ = k˙/k can be positive and output
can grow at a positive rate. We summarize:
Proposition 1 Persistent growth is possible only with proportional conges-
tion δ = 1. With partial congestion, 0 < δ < 1, there is no such growth.
With proportional congestion, the average product of capital, y/k, is con-
stant, there is no equilibrium for capital stock and capital grows indefinitely.
With partial congestion, the average product of capital is decreasing, there
is an equilibrium for capital stock and there is no growth in capital.
An family’s budget constraint is given by
(1− x)(1− q)y + qy = E + iM/p+ V + Z, (8)
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where y is its output (= total real income), qy its hidden income, (1− q)y its
revealed income, x the tax rate, E its real expenditure, M its money supply,
iM/p the depreciation in its real balances M/p due to the inflation rate i, V
its purchase of transaction services and Z its costs in tax evasion. Given (3),
(5), (6), (7), δ = 1, y = ξk and φ
.
= k˙/k, the constraint (8) takes the form
[(1− x)(1− q) + q − z(q)]ξ = [(1− x)(1− q) + q − z(q)]y/k
= (1 + im+ v)E/k = [1 + im+ v(m)](c+ φ+ βg). (9)
An family maximizes its utility (4) subject to its budget constraint (9) and
its capital accumulation φ
.
= k˙/k by the consumption-capital ratio c, the
rate of investment, φ, the ratio of hidden to total income, q, and the money-
expenditure ratio m, given the inflation rate i, the tax rate x, medical care
G, the aggregate capital stock K and g = G/K.
Since our purpose is to examine public policy in an economy with per-
sistent growth, then, given proposition 1, we can focus wholly on the case
δ = 1. Given δ = 1, G˜ = G (4) and (9), the family maximizes its utility∫ ∞
0
U(c, g)k1−σe−ρtdt =
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
1− σ (c+ αg)
1−σk1−σdt
subject to the budget constraint (9) and capital accumulation φ
.
= k˙/k by
variables c, φ, z, q and m, given i, x, G, K and g
.
= G/K. The Lagrangean
of this maximization is given by
Ψ = (c+ αg)1−σk1−σ/(1− σ) + µφk
+ ω
{
[(1− x)(1− q) + q − z(q)]ξ − [1 + im+ v(m)](c+ φ+ βg)},
(10)
where ω is a Lagrangean multiplier and variable µ evolves such that
µ˙ = ρµ− ∂Ψ/∂k = (ρ− φ)µ− (c+ αg)1−σk−σ, lim
t→∞
µke−ρt = 0. (11)
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4 The equilibrium of the private sector
The maximization of the Langrangean (10) by q leads, by duality and by the
properties of the function (5), to the definition
pi(x)
.
= max
q
[(1− x)(1− q) + q − z(q)], pi′ < 0, pi′′ > 0. (12)
Given this definition, we obtain the tax base T and the elasticity of the tax
base with respect to the tax rate x, when capital k and medical care intensity
g are kept constant, as follows:
T = (1− q)y = −pi′(x)ξk, η(x) .= − x
T
∂T
∂x
= −xpi
′′(x)
pi′(x)
> 0. (13)
Given (4), the maximization of the Lagrangean (10) by m yields
v′(m) = −i. (14)
From this and (7) it follows that the money-expenditure ratio,m, is a function
of the inflation rate i only:
m(i), m′ .=
dm
di
= − 1
v′′
< 0, ε(i)
.
= − im
′
m
=
{
> 0 for m < m¯,
= 0 for m = m¯,
(15)
where ε is the elasticity of the demand for money with respect to the inflation
rate i, when real expenditure E is kept constant.
The maximization of the Lagrangean (10) by c and φ yields
∂Ψ/∂c = (c+ αg)−σk1−σ − [1 + im+ v(m)]ω = 0,
∂Ψ/∂φ = µk − [1 + im+ v(m)]ω = 0. (16)
Output y = ξk, consumption ck and medical services G˜ = gk are now in
fixed proportion to capital stock k, which is the family’s only state variable.
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Consequently, the system jumps immediately to the steady state and there
are no transitional dynamics. Given the first-order conditions (16), we obtain
µ = (1 + im+ v)ω/k = (c+ αg)−σk−σ.
This implies that terms k−σ and µ grow at the same rate, µ˙/µ = −σ k˙/k =
−σφ. This, (11) and (14) produce
ρ+ (σ − 1)φ = (c+ αg)1−σk−σ/µ = c+ αg. (17)
Inserting δ = 1, (12) into (9) and solving for φ, we obtain
k˙/k = φ = ξpi(x)/[1 + im+ v(m)]− c− βg. (18)
A balanced-growth equilibrium exists in the model, because the model is
proportional to the state variable k. Inserting (17) into (18) yields:
φ = Φ(x, i, g, ρ, ξ)
.
=
1
σ
[ ξpi(x)
1 + im+ v(m)
+ (α− β)g − ρ
]
. (19)
Because in equilibrium the consumption-capital ratio c, the rate of investment
φ and the money-expenditure ratio m are kept constant, given (7), money
supply M and the price level p grow at the same rate, p˙/p = M˙/M . Hence,
by increasing the quantity of money per family, M , at a fixed rate, the
government can control the inflation rate i
.
= p˙/p = M˙/M .
5 Governments
Because the families are similar, aggregate capital is given by K = Jk, where
J is the number of families. Since the public expenditures on medical care,
(1−β)G, are financed by taxes xT and seigniorage iM/p from all J families,
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the government’s budget constraint is (iM/p+ xT )J = (1− β)G. Given (7),
(12), (13), (15), (19), g = G/K and K = Jk, this constraint also reads as:
Υ(i, g, x, ξ)
.
=
[(
i
M
p
+ xT
)
J − (1− β)G
] 1
ξK
= (c+ φ)i
m
ξ
− xpi′ − (1− β)g
ξ
=
pi(x)im(i)
1 + im+ v(m)
− xpi′(x)− (1− β)g
ξ
= 0. (20)
We assume that the economy is on the increasing part of the Laffer curve.
This means that if the government budget is initially balanced, Υ = 0,
and the inflation rate i is kept constant, then an increase in the tax rate x
produces a budget surplus Υ > 0. Given (12), (13) and (20), this implies
∂Υ
∂x
= pi′
[ im
1 + im+ v
− 1 + η
]
> 0, 1 > η +
im
1 + im+ v
. (21)
The government maximizes welfare by the tax rate x, the inflation rate i
and medical care intensity g
.
= G/K, given the budget constraint (20). We
can equivalently express the budget constraint (20) in terms of the tax rate
and assume that the government maximizes welfare by i and g, given this
tax function. Differentiating (20) totally, and noting (13), (15) and (21), we
obtain the tax rate as the following function of the other policy variables
(i, g) and the parameters ξ and β:
x(i, g, ξ, β),
∂x
∂ξ
= (β − 1) g
ξ2
/
∂Υ
∂x
< 0,
∂x
∂β
= − g
ξ
/
∂Υ
∂x
< 0,
∂x
∂g
= − ∂Υ
∂g
/
∂Υ
∂x
=
1− β
ξpi′
[ im
1 + im+ v
− 1 + η
]−1
> 0,
∂x
∂i
= − ∂Υ
∂i
/
∂Υ
∂x
=
[
m
(1 + im+ v)2
− m+ im
′
1 + im+ v
]
pi
/
∂Υ
∂x
=
m(i)pi(x)
[1 + im+ v(m)]pi′(x)
ε(i) + im(i)/[1 + im+ v(m)]− 1
η(x) + im(i)/[1 + im+ v(m)]− 1 . (22)
Given (13), (18), (19) and (22), the growth rate can then be specified as a
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function of the policy variables (i, g) and the parameters (ρ, ξ, α) (Appendix):
k˙/k = φ(i, g, ρ, ξ, α)
.
= Φ(x(i, g, ξ), i, g, ρ, ξ, α),
∂φ
∂β
> 0 ⇔ η(x) > v(m(i))
1 + im+ v(m)
,
∂φ
∂g
=
(1− β)/σ
im+ [η(x)− 1][1 + im+ v(m)] +
α− β
σ
,
∂φ
∂i
=
∂Φ
∂x
∂x
∂i
+
∂Φ
∂i
=
pi(x)m(i)ξ/σ
[1 + im+ v(m)]2
η(x)− ε(i)
1− η(x)− im(i)/[1 + im+ v(m)] ,
∂2φ
∂g2
< 0 ⇔ ∂
2φ
∂g∂i
∣∣∣∣
∂φ/∂i=0
> 0,
∂φ
∂ξ
> 0,
∂φ
∂α
> 0,
∂φ
∂ρ
< 0,
∂2φ
∂g∂ρ
≡ 0, ∂
2φ
∂i∂ρ
≡ 0, ∂
2φ
∂i∂α
≡ 0, ∂
2φ
∂g∂α
=
1
σ
> 0,
∂2φ
∂g∂i
∣∣∣∣
∂φ/∂i=0
/
∂2φ
∂i∂ξ
∣∣∣∣
∂φ/∂i=0
=
∂2φ
∂g2
/
∂2φ
∂g∂ξ
,
∂2φ
∂g∂i
∣∣∣∣
∂φ/∂i=0
/
∂2φ
∂i∂β
∣∣∣∣
∂φ/∂i=0
=
∂2φ
∂g2
/
∂2φ
∂g∂β
. (23)
The government maximizes the representative family’s utility (4) by g and
i, given the accumulation of capital (23) and the family’s reaction function
(17). It is equivalent to maximizing the Hamiltonian
Λ = [ρ+ (σ − 1)φ(i, g, ρ, ξ)]1−σk1−σ/(1− σ) + λφ(i, g, ρ, ξ)k (24)
by g and i, where variable λ evolves according to
λ˙ = ρλ− ∂Λ/∂k = (ρ− φ)λ− [ρ+ (σ − 1)φ]1−σk−σ, lim
t→∞
µke−ρt = 0. (25)
6 Public policy
Because the model of an family contains only one state variable k and is
linearly homogeneous with respect to this, the system jumps immediately to
the steady state in which c, φ, g, ∂φ/∂i, ∂φ/∂g and ∂c/∂φ are constants.
Given (24), this means that λ and k−σ must grow at the same rate, λ˙/λ =
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−σk˙/k = −σφ. Inserting this into (25) and noting (17), we obtain λkσ =
[ρ+ (σ − 1)φ]−σ. This and (24) yield
∂Λ/∂φ = [ρ+ (σ − 1)φ]−σk1−σ(σ − 1) + λk = σλk > 0,
which implies
argmax
i,g
Λ = argmax
i,g
φ(i, g, ρ, ξ, α). (26)
This result can be rephrased as follows:9
Proposition 2 A rational government attempts to maximize the growth rate
of its economy by its policy variables (i, g).
In an endogenous growth model, the congestion of medical care must be
proportional (see proposition 1). This implies that private income is in fixed
proportion to capital, and that the government instruments i and g affect
welfare only through the growth rate of the economy.
Because (23) yields that
(∂/∂ρ)max
i,g
φ < 0, (∂/∂ξ)max
i,g
φ > 0, (∂/∂α)max
i,g
φ > 0,
we obtain the following result:
Proposition 3 A decline in mortality (i.e. a lower ρ) and an increase in
labour supply (i.e. a bigger ξ) promote growth and welfare. Increased demand
for medical care (i.e. a bigger α) speeds up economic growth.
A decline in mortality or higher labour supply enable a higher savings rate,
which boosts capital accumulation and growth. The higher the relative
9This proposition is the same as in Palokangas (2003).
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weight of medical care and lower the relative weight of consumption in a
family’s preferences, the less incentives the family has to consume and the
more to save. A higher savings rate boosts capital accumulation and growth.
The first-order and second-order conditions corresponding to (26) are
∂φ
∂i
= 0,
∂φ
∂g
= 0,
∂2φ
∂i2
< 0,
∂2φ
∂g2
< 0, J .= ∂
2φ
∂i2
∂2φ
∂g2
−
( ∂2φ
∂i∂g
)2
> 0.
(27)
Given this and (23), we reconstruct a result from Palokangas (1997; 2003):
Proposition 4 (Ramsey rule) A rational government chooses he inflation
rate i so that the elasticity of money holdings with respect to the inflation rate,
ε, is equal to the elasticity of the tax base with respect to the tax rate, η.
Since the inflation rate is equivalent to a tax on money, the elasticity of tax
revenue with respect to the tax rate, 1− η, must be equal to the elasticity of
seigniorage with respect to the inflation rate, 1− ε, which yields η = ε.
The optimal funding of social security is given by ∂Λ/∂β = ∂φ/∂β = 0.
Given (23), this leads to the following result:
Proposition 5 To promote growth and welfare, private finance in medical
care should be increased (decreased) as long as the elasticity of the tax base,
η, is greater (lower) than the share of transaction cost in total private expen-
diture, v/(1 + im+ v).
The unfunded social security system causes deadweight loss through distort-
ing taxation, but the fully funded system involves transaction costs. The
proportion of funding in medical care should be determined by a trade-off
between these two losses.
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From (23) and (27) it follows that
∂2φ
∂i∂g
< 0,
∂2φ
∂g∂ρ
=
∂2φ
∂i∂ρ
=
∂2φ
∂i∂α
= 0,
∂2φ
∂g∂α
> 0. (28)
Differentiating the first-order conditions ∂φ/∂i = 0 and ∂φ/∂g = 0 totally
and noting (23), (27) and (28), we obtain the partial derivatives
∂i
∂ρ
≡ 0, ∂i
∂α
=
1
J
∂2φ
∂i∂g
∂2φ
∂g∂α
> 0,
∂i
∂ξ
=
1
J
[
∂2φ
∂g∂i
∂2φ
∂g∂ξ
− ∂
2φ
∂i∂ξ
∂2φ
∂g2
]
≡ 0,
∂i
∂β
=
1
J
[
∂2φ
∂g∂i
∂2φ
∂g∂β
− ∂
2φ
∂i∂β
∂2φ
∂g2
]
≡ 0.
These results can be rephrased as follows:
Proposition 6 Mortality (i.e. ρ), labour supply (i.e. ξ) and the funding
of social security (i.e. β) have no effect on the inflation rate i. A higher
demand for medical care (i.e. a bigger α) speeds up inflation.
A decline in mortality, higher labour supply or greater funding of social
security boost saving and economic growth, but do not affect public finance.
With a higher demand for medical care, the inflation tax should be raised to
collect more seigniorage.
7 Currency unions
Finally, we examine the consequences of monetary integration. Proposition
6 has then the following corollary:
Proposition 7 Mortality (i.e. ρ) and labour supply (i.e. ξ) have no effect
on monetary integration.
Let there be two economies, labelled 1 and 2. The economies are similar,
except that economy 1 has a larger demand for medical care (i.e. α1 > α2).
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Economy 1 has then a lower inflation rate than economy 2,
i1 < i2. (29)
Each economy can exercise fiscal and monetary policy independently of the
other, and the growth rates of each may also differ.10 On the assumption
that in both economies fiscal policy is chosen to maximize the welfare of the
representative family, we can define the economy-specific growth rates as:
φ1
.
= {φ| ξ = ξ1, fiscal policy optimized in economy 1},
φ2
.
= {φ| ξ = ξ2, fiscal policy optimized in economy 2}.
According to proposition 2, the independent monetary policy of economy j
should maximize its growth rate φj. This yields
ij
.
= argmax
i
φj for j = 1, 2. (30)
Now assume that the two economies form a currency union so that a
common central bank will set a common inflation rate ι for them. This central
bank maximizes a target W(φ1, φ2), which is a differentiable and increasing
function of the growth rates of economies φ1 and φ2. The maximization
yields the first-order condition
dW
dι
=
∂W
∂φ1
∂φ1
∂i
∣∣∣∣
i=ι
+
∂W
∂φ2
∂φ2
∂i
∣∣∣∣
i=ι
= 0.
Given this, the partial derivatives [∂φ1/∂i]i=ι and [∂φ
2/∂i]i=ι must have
different signs. In economy j with [∂φ1/∂i]i=ι > 0, the inflation rate i
must be increased from ι to attain the growth-maximizing level ij with
10This property is mainly due to the assumption of a small economy and the exclusion of
direct foreign investment from the model, but it helps in analysing monetary integration.
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[∂φ1/∂i]i=ij = 0, and in economy j with [∂φ
1/∂i]i=ι < 0, i must be de-
creased from ι to attain ij. Given (29), this is true only when i1 < ι < i2.
We have thus obtained our final result:
Proposition 8 The establishment of the currency union by two economies
will increase (decrease) the inflation rate in the economy with a larger
(smaller) demand for medical care, i1 < ι (i2 > ι), and decrease the growth
rate and welfare in both economies, φj
∣∣
i=ι
< maxi φ
j = φj
∣∣
i=ij
for j = 1, 2.
If institutional differences of potential members are too large, the establish-
ment of a currency union will slow down economic growth and increase the
inflation rate in the union.
8 Conclusions
This paper examines economies in which the main engine of growth is the ex-
istence of a lower limit for the marginal product of (human) capital. Money
is introduced as a substitute for transaction services and seigniorage as a
substitute for distorting taxation. The governments produce public services
(e.g. medical care) from private sector output and finance this by taxation
and seigniorage. In this setting, the establishment of a currency union af-
fects growth and welfare through unifying the inflation rate throughout the
member economies. Aging is characterized by three shocks: (i) a decline in
mortality, (ii) a decline in the productivity of capital (through smaller work-
ing population) and (iii) an increase in the demand for medical care. We are
also interested in how the structure of the social security system affects the
outcome of aging. The main findings are the following.
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A rational government in any member economy attempts to maximize
the growth rate of its economy by taxation and seigniorage. This is because
in an endogenous growth model, the congestion of medical care must be pro-
portional. In such a case, private income is in fixed proportion to capital and
the government’s policy instruments affect welfare only through the growth
rate of the economy. A decline in mortality and an increase in labour supply
raise savings and thereby promote growth and welfare. The higher the rela-
tive weight of medical care and lower the relative weight of consumption in
a family’s preferences, the less incentives the family has to consume and the
more to save. A higher savings rate boosts capital accumulation and growth.
To even out the deadweight loss in public finance, a rational government
in any member economy chooses he inflation rate so that the elasticity of
money holdings with respect to the inflation rate is equal to the elasticity of
the tax base with respect to the tax rate. To promote growth and welfare,
private finance in medical care should be increased (decreased) as long as the
elasticity of the tax base is greater (lower) than the share of transaction cost
in total private expenditure. The unfunded social security system causes
deadweight loss through distorting taxation, but the fully funded system
involves transaction costs. Hence, the proportion of funding in medical care
should be determined by a trade-off between these two losses.
A decline in mortality, higher labour supply or greater funding of social se-
curity boost saving and economic growth, but do not affect public finance and
consequently does not have any effect on seigniorage. This means that mor-
tality and labour supply have no effect on monetary integration. Economies
with different rates of mortality and different proportions of working popula-
tion can have the same inflation rate without any deadweight loss in public
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finance. With a higher demand for medical care, the inflation tax should be
raised to collect more seigniorage. This means that the establishment of the
currency union by two economies will increase (decrease) the inflation rate
in the economy with a larger (smaller) demand for medical care. This com-
pels sub-optimal taxation and public policy for both economies, which also
decreases the growth rate and welfare in both economies. Hence, the need
for medical care seems to the only characteristics of aging which influences
the possibilities of monetary integration. If differences in it among potential
members are too large, the establishment of a currency union will slow down
economic growth and increase the inflation rate in the union.
Appendix
From (13), (18), (19) and (22) it follows that
k˙/k = φ(i, g, ρ, ξ, α)
.
= Φ(x(i, g, ξ), i, g, ρ, ξ, α),
∂φ
∂g
=
∂Φ
∂x
∂x
∂g
+
∂Φ
∂g
=
ξpi′/σ
1 + im+ v
∂x
∂g
+
α− β
σ
=
(1− β)/σ
im+ [η(x)− 1][1 + im+ v(m)] +
α− β
σ
,
∂φ
∂i
=
∂Φ
∂x
∂x
∂i
+
∂Φ
∂i
=
ξ/σ
1 + im+ v
[
pi′
∂x
∂i
− pim
1 + im+ v
]
=
pimξ/σ
(1 + im+ v)2
{
ε+ im/(1 + im+ v)− 1
η + im/(1 + im+ v)− 1 − 1
}
=
pi(x)m(i)ξ/σ
[1 + im+ v(m)]2
η(x)− ε(i)
1− η(x)− im(i)/[1 + im+ v(m)] ,
∂φ
∂ξ
=
∂Φ
∂ξ
+
∂Φ
∂x
∂x
∂ξ
> 0,
∂φ
∂α
=
∂Φ
∂α
=
g
σ
> 0,
∂φ
∂ρ
= − 1
σ
< 0,
∂φ
∂β
=
∂Φ
∂β
+
∂Φ
∂x
∂x
∂β
= − g
σ
− g/σ
1 + im+ v
/[ im
1 + im+ v
− 1 + η
]
=
g
σ
η − v/(1 + im+ v)
1− η − im/(1 + im+ v) > 0 ⇔ η >
v
1 + im+ v
,
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∂2φ
∂g2
=
−(1 + im+ v)η′
σ{im+ [η(x)− 1][1 + im+ v(m)]}2
∂x
∂g
< 0 ⇔
∂2φ
∂g∂ξ
=
−(1 + im+ v)η′
σ{im+ [η(x)− 1][1 + im+ v(m)]}2
∂x
∂ξ
> 0 ⇔
∂2φ
∂g∂β
=
−(1 + im+ v)η′
σ{im+ [η(x)− 1][1 + im+ v(m)]}2
∂x
∂β
> 0 ⇔
∂2φ
∂g∂i
∣∣∣∣
∂φ/∂i=0
=
pimξ/σ
(1 + im+ v)2
η′(x)
1− η − im/(1 + im+ v)
∂x
∂g
> 0 ⇔
∂2φ
∂i∂ξ
∣∣∣∣
∂φ/∂i=0
=
pimξ/σ
(1 + im+ v)2
η′(x)
1− η − im/(1 + im+ v)
∂x
∂ξ
< 0 ⇔
∂2φ
∂i∂β
∣∣∣∣
∂φ/∂i=0
=
pimξ/σ
(1 + im+ v)2
η′(x)
1− η − im/(1 + im+ v)
∂x
∂β
< 0 ⇔ η′ > 0,
∂2φ
∂g∂ρ
≡ 0, ∂
2φ
∂i∂ρ
≡ 0, ∂
2φ
∂i∂α
≡ 0, ∂
2φ
∂g∂α
=
1
σ
> 0,
∂2φ
∂g∂i
∣∣∣∣
∂φ/∂i=0
/
∂2φ
∂i∂ξ
∣∣∣∣
∂φ/∂i=0
=
∂x
∂g
/
∂x
∂ξ
=
∂2φ
∂g2
/
∂2φ
∂g∂ξ
,
∂2φ
∂g∂i
∣∣∣∣
∂φ/∂i=0
/
∂2φ
∂i∂β
∣∣∣∣
∂φ/∂i=0
=
∂x
∂g
/
∂x
∂β
=
∂2φ
∂g2
/
∂2φ
∂g∂β
.
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